Randomness extraction involves the processing of purely classical information and is therefore usually studied in the framework of classical probability theory. However, such a classical treatment is generally too restrictive for applications, where side information about the values taken by classical random variables may be represented by the state of a quantum system. This is particularly relevant in the context of cryptography, where an adversary may make use of quantum devices. Here, we show that the well known construction paradigm for extractors proposed by Trevisan is sound in the presence of quantum side information.
Introduction
Randomness extraction is the art of generating (almost) uniform randomness from any weakly random source X. More precisely, a randomness extractor (or, simply extractor ) is a function Ext that takes as input X together with a uniformly distributed (and usually short) string Y , called the seed, and outputs a string Z. One then requires Z to be almost uniformly distributed whenever the min-entropy of X is larger than some threshold k, i.e., H min (X) ≥ k =⇒ Z := Ext(X, Y ) statistically close to uniform.
(1)
The min-entropy of a random variable X is directly related to the probability of correctly guessing the value of X using an optimal strategy: 2 −Hmin(X) = max x P X (x). Hence Criterion (1) can be interpreted operationally: if the maximum probability of successfully guessing the input of the extractor, X, is sufficiently low then its output is statistically close to uniform.
In most applications, such as privacy amplification [BBR88, BBCM95] , or simply when applying two extractors in succession 1 to the same input X, there is a notion of side information, which describes the information about the input which is contained in the environment, or accessible to an adversary. Notions of randomness such as the guessing probability, min-entropy or the uniformity of a random variable naturally always depend on the side information relative to which they are defined, and in particular one would like the output of the extractor to be uniform with respect to the side information. Hence we may make this requirement explicit in our formulation of Criterion (1) by denoting by E all side information with respect to which the extractor's output should be uniform:
H min (X|E) ≥ k =⇒ Z := Ext(X, Y ) statistically close to uniform (2) conditioned on E, where H min (X|E) is the conditional min-entropy, formally defined in Section 2.2. This conditioning naturally extends the operational interpretation of the minentropy to scenarios with side information, i.e., 2 −Hmin(X|E) is the maximum probability of correctly guessing X, given access to side information E [KRS09] .
Interestingly, the relationship between the two Criteria (1) and (2) depends on the physical nature of the side information E, i.e., whether E is represented by the state of a classical or a quantum system. In the case of purely classical side information, E may be modeled as a random variable and it is known that the two criteria are essentially equivalent (see Lemma 3.3 for a precise statement). But in the general case where E is a quantum system, Criterion (2) is strictly stronger than (1): it was shown in [GKK + 07] that there exist extractors that fulfill (1) but for which (2) fails (see also [KR07] for a discussion).
Since our world is inherently non-classical, it is of particular importance that (2) rather than the weaker Criterion (1) be taken as the relevant criterion for the definition of extractors. For example, in the context of cryptography, one typically uses extractors to generate secret keys, i.e., randomness that is uniform from an adversary's point of view. Even if the extractor itself is classical, nothing can prevent an adversary from storing information E in a quantum system, so Criterion (1) does not imply security. Randomness recycling is another simple example involving quantum side information. If we run a (simulation of) a quantum system E using randomness X, approximately H min (X|E) bits of X can be reused. Applying a function Ext which has been shown to fulfill (1) but not (2) could result in an output Z which is still correlated to the system E.
Moreover, since it is known that the smooth conditional min-entropy precisely characterizes the optimal amount of uniform randomness that can be extracted from X while being independent from E [Ren05], one may argue that Criterion (2) is indeed the correct definition for randomness extraction.
In particular, we would like to point out that the popular bounded storage model -in which the entropy of the source H min (X|E) is lower-bounded by H min (X) − H 0 (E) and H 0 (E) denotes the number of qubits needed to store E -is strictly weaker: there are sources X and nontrivial side information E such that H min (X) − H 0 (E) ≪ H min (X|E), 2 and extractors which are sound for any input with H min (X) − H 0 (E) ≥ k, but cannot be applied to all sources with H min (X|E) ≥ k. An extractor which has only been proven sound in the bounded storage model can thus only extract H min (X) − H 0 (E) bits of uniform randomness instead of the optimal H ε min (X|E) bits. For the same reason in the purely classical case, no recent work defines classical extractors for randomness sources with side information stored in bounded classical memories. Furthermore, in applications where extractors are used, the increased generality of the conditional min-entropy over the bounded storage model is often what is needed. For example in quantum key distribution, where extractors are used for privacy amplification [Ren05] , it is generally impossible to bound the adversary's memory size.
Related results. In the standard literature on randomness extraction, constructions of extractors are usually shown to fulfill Criterion (1), for certain values of the threshold k (see [Zuc90] as well as [Sha02] for an overview). However, only a few constructions have been shown to fulfill Criterion (2) with arbitrary quantum side information E. Among them is two-universal hashing [Ren05, TSSR10] as well as constructions based on the sample-and-hash approach [KR07] .
Recently, Ta-Shma [TS09] studied Trevisan's extractor construction [Tre01] in the bounded quantum storage model. Although his proof requires the output length to be much smaller than the min-entropy of the original data, the result was a breakthrough because it, for the first time, implied the existence of "quantum-proof" extractors requiring only short seeds (logarithmic in the input length). More recently, two of the present authors [DV10] were able to improve the output length that Trevisan's extractor could provably extract in the presence of a quantum bounded-storage adversary, bringing it close to what is known for the case of classical adversaries. However, both these results are proved in the bounded quantum storage model, which, as discussed previously, only allows the extractor to output at most H min (X)− H 0 (E) bits. This expression can in general be arbitrarily smaller than H min (X|E), and in some cases may even become 0 (or negative) for n-bit sources for which it is possible to extract Ω(n) bits of randomness.
2
Subsequent to this work, Ben-Aroya and Ta-Shma [BATS10] showed how two versions of Trevisan's extractor, shown quantum-proof in this paper, can be combined to extract a constant fraction of the min-entropy of an n-bit source with a seed of length O(log n), when H min (X|E) > n/2. This is better than the 2 This can easily be seen by considering the following example. Let X be uniformly distributed on {0, 1} n and E be X with each bit flipped with constant probability ε < 1/2. Then H min (X|E) = Θ(n), but H min (X) − H 0 (E) = 0.
3 Restricting the class of randomness sources further than by bounding their min-entropy can have advantages, e.g., if we consider only bit-fixing sources, or sources generated by a random walk on a Markov chain, then the extractor can be deterministic. (See [Sha02] for a brief overview of restricted families of sources studied in the literature.) There is however no known advantage (e.g., in terms of seed length) in considering only input sources with side information stored in memory of bounded size, whether it is classical or quantum memory. straightforward application of Trevisan's extractor analyzed here, which requires O(log 2 n) bits of seed for the same output size (but works for any H min (X|E)).
Our results. In this work, we show that the performance of Trevisan's extractor does not suffer in the presence of quantum side information. More precisely, we show that the output length of the extractor can be close to the optimal conditional min-entropy H min (X|E) (see Corollary 5.4 for the exact parameters). This is the first proof of security of an extractor with poly-logarithmic seed meeting Criterion (2) in the presence of arbitrary quantum side information. More generally, we prove security of a whole class of extractors. It has been observed, by, e.g., Lu and Vadhan [Lu04, Vad04] , that Trevisan's extractor [Tre01] (and variations of it, such as [RRV02]) is a concatenation of the outputs of a one-bit extractor with different pseudo-random seeds. Since the proof of the extractor property is independent of the type of the underlying onebit extractor (and to some extent the construction of the pseudo-random seeds), our result is valid for a generic scheme (defined in Section 4.1, Definition 4.2). We find that the performance of this generic scheme in the context of quantum side information is roughly equivalent to the (known) case of purely classical side information (Section 4.2, Theorem 4.6).
Our argument follows in spirit the work of De and Vidick [DV10] . Technically, the proof is essentially a concatenation of the two following ideas.
• In the first part of the original proof of Trevisan [Tre01] , it is shown that the ability to distinguish the extractor's output from uniform implies the ability to distinguish the output of the underlying one-bit extractor from uniform (a list-decodable code in Trevisan's original scheme). Ta-Shma has argued that this claim is still true in the context of quantum side information [TS09] , by treating the adversary as an oracle and measuring its memory size by counting the queries to the oracle. We extend this result to the case of arbitrary quantum side information, where the entropy of the source is measured with the conditional min-entropy, and show that it still holds even if the seed of the underlying one-bit extractor is not fully uniform.
• This reduces the problem to proving that the one-bit extractor used in the construction is quantum-proof. However, because for one-bit extractors, the more general Criterion (2) is essentially equivalent to the usual Criterion (1), as shown by König and Terhal [KT08] , the claim follows from known classical results on one-bit extractors with only a small loss in the error parameter.
This proof structure results in a very modular extractor construction paradigm, which allows arbitrary one-bit extractors and pseudo-random seeds to be "plugged in," producing different final constructions, optimized for different needs, e.g., maximizing the output length, minimizing the seed, or even using a non-uniform seed if the underlying one-bit extractor also uses a non-uniform seed. In Table 1 we give a brief overview of the final constructions proposed.
Organization of the paper. We first define the necessary technical tools in Section 2, in particular the conditional min-entropy. In Section 3 we give Table 1 : Plugging various weak designs and 1-bit extractors in Trevisan's construction, we obtain these concrete extractors. Here n is the input length, ε = poly(1/n) the error, α and γ are arbitrary constants such that 0 < γ < α ≤ 1, and 1 2 < β < 1 is a specific constant.
formal definitions of extractors and discuss briefly how much randomness can be extracted from a given source. Section 4 contains the description of Trevisan's extractor construction paradigm and a proof that it is still sound in the presence of quantum side information. Then in Section 5 we plug in various one-bit extractors and pseudo-random seed constructions, resulting in, amongst others, a construction which is nearly optimal in the amount of randomness extracted in Section 5.1 (which is identical to the best known bound in the classical case [RRV02] for Trevisan's extractor), and a construction which is still sound if there is a small linear entropy loss in the seed in Section 5.4. Finally, in Section 6, we mention a few classical results which modify and improve Trevisan's extractor, but for which the correctness in the presence of quantum side information does not seem to follow immediately from this work.
2 Technical preliminaries
Notation
We write [N ] for the set of integers {1, . . . , N }. If x ∈ {0, 1} n is a string of length n, i ∈ [n] an integer, and S ⊆ [n] a set of integers, we write x i for the i th bit of x, and x S for the string formed by the bits of x at the positions given by the elements of S.
H always denotes a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. We denote by P(H) the set of positive semi-definite operators on H. We define the set of normalized quantum states S(H) := {ρ ∈ P(H) : tr ρ = 1} and the set of sub-normalized quantum states S ≤ (H) := {ρ ∈ P(H) : tr ρ ≤ 1}.
We write H AB = H A ⊗ H B for a bipartite quantum system and ρ AB ∈ P(H AB ) for a bipartite quantum state. ρ A = tr B (ρ AB ) and ρ B = tr A (ρ AB ) denote the corresponding reduced density operators.
If a classical random variable X takes the value x ∈ X with probability p x , it can be represented by the state ρ X = x∈X p x |x x|, where {|x } x∈X is an orthonormal basis of a Hilbert space H X . If the classical system X is part of a composite system XB, any state of that composite system can be written as
· tr denotes the trace norm and is defined by A tr := tr √ A † A.
Min-entropy
To measure how much randomness a source contains and can be extracted, we need to use the smooth conditional min-entropy. This entropy measure was first defined by Renner [Ren05] , and represents the optimal measure for randomness extraction in the sense that it is always possible to extract that amount of almost-uniform randomness from a source, but never more.
Definition 2.1 (conditional min-entropy). Let ρ AB ∈ S ≤ (H AB ). The minentropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
We will often drop the subscript ρ when there is no doubt about what underlying state is meant.
This definition has a simple operational interpretation when the first system is classical, which is the case we consider. König et al. [KRS09] showed that for a state
where p guess (X|B) is the maximum probability of guessing X given B, namely
where the maximum is taken over all POVMs {E x B } x∈X on B. If the system B is empty, then the min-entropy of X reduces to the standard definition, H min (X) = − log max x∈X p x (sometimes written H ∞ (X)). In this case the connection to the guessing probability is particularly obvious: when no side information is available, the best guess we can make is simply the value x ∈ X with highest probability.
As hinted at the beginning of this section, the min-entropy is not quite optimal, in the sense that it is sometimes possible to extract more randomness. However, the smooth min-entropy is optimal. This information measure consists in maximizing the min-entropy over all sub-normalized states ε-close to the actual state ρ XB of the system considered. Thus by introducing an extra error ε, we have a state with potentially much more entropy. (See Section 3.2 for more details.) Definition 2.2 (smooth min-entropy). Let ε ≥ 0 and ρ AB ∈ S ≤ (H AB ), then the ε-smooth min-entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
is a ball of sub-normalized states of radius ε around ρ AB .
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4 Theoretically any distance measure could be used to define an ε-ball. We use the purified distance, P (ρ, σ) := 1 − F (ρ, σ) 2 , where F (·, ·) is the fidelity, since this measure has some advantages over other metrics such as the trace distance. The only propriety of the purified distance we need in this work is that it is larger than the trace distance, i.e., P (ρ, σ) ≥ 1 2 ρ − σ tr . We refer to [TCR10] for a formal definition of the purified distance (and fidelity) on sub-normalized states and a discussion of its advantages.
Extractors
3.1 Extractors, side information, and privacy amplification
m is a function which takes a weak source of randomness X and a uniformly random, short seed Y , and produces some output Ext(X, Y ), which is almost uniform. The extractor is said to be strong, if the output is approximately independent from the seed.
m is a (k, ε)-strong extractor with uniform seed, if for all distributions X with H min (X) ≥ k and a uniform seed Y , we have
where ρ Um is the fully mixed state on a system of dimension 2 m .
Using the connection between min-entropy and guessing probability (see Eq. (3)), a (k, ε)-strong extractor can be seen as a function which guarantees that if the guessing probability of X is not too high (p guess (X) ≤ 2 −k ), then it produces a random variable which is approximately uniform and independent from the seed Y .
As discussed in the introduction, we consider here a more general situation involving side information, denoted by E, which may be represented by the state of a quantum system. We then want to find some function Ext such that, if the probability of guessing X given E is not too high, Ext can produce a random variable Ext(X, Y ) which is approximately uniform and independent from the seed Y and the side information E. Equivalently, one may think of a privacy amplification scenario [BBR88, BBCM95] , where E is the information available to an adversary and where the goal is to turn weakly secret data X into a secret key Ext(X, Y ), where the seed Y is assumed to be public. (In typical key agreement protocols, the seed is chosen by the legitimate parties and exchanged over public channels.)
The following definition covers the general situation where the side information E may be represented quantum-mechanically. The case of purely classical side information is then formulated as a restriction on the nature of E.
Definition 3.2 (quantum-proof strong extractor). A function Ext
m is a quantum-proof (or simply quantum) (k, ε)-strong extractor with uniform seed, if for all states ρ XE classical on X with H min (X|E) ρ ≥ k, and for a uniform seed Y , we have
where ρ Um is the fully mixed state on a system of dimension 2 m . The function Ext is a classical-proof (k, ε)-strong extractor with uniform seed if the same holds with the system E restricted to classical states.
5 A more standard classical notation would be
where the distance metric is the variational distance. However, since classical random variables can be represented by quantum states diagonal in the computational basis, and the trace distance reduces to the variational distance, we use the quantum notation for compatibility with the rest of this work.
It turns out that if the system E is restricted to classical information about X, then this definition is essentially equivalent to the conventional Definition 3.1.
Lemma 3.3 ([KT08, Proposition 1]). Any (k, ε)-strong extractor is a classicalproof (k + log 1/ε, 2ε)-strong extractor.
However, if the system E is quantum, this does not necessarily hold. Gavinsky et al. [GKK + 07] give an example of a (k, ε)-strong extractor, which breaks down in the presence of quantum side information, even when H min (X|E) is significantly larger than k.
Remark 3.4. In this section we defined extractors to use a uniform seed, as this is the most common way of defining them. Instead one could use a seed which is only weakly random, but require it to have a min-entropy larger than a given threshold, H min (Y ) ≥ s. The seed must still be independent from the input and the side information. We redefine extractors formally this way in Appendix A.1. All the considerations of this section, in particular Lemma 3.3 and the gap between classical and quantum side-information, also apply if the seed is only weakly random. In the following, when we simply talk about a strong extractor, without specifying the nature of the seed, we are referring to both uniform seeded and weakly random seeded extractors.
Extracting more randomness
Radhakrishnan and Ta-Shma [RTS00] have shown that a (k, ε)-strong extractor Ext :
However, in some situations we can extract much more randomness than the min-entropy. For example, let X be distributed on {0, 1} n with Pr[X = x 0 ] = 1/n and for all x = x 0 , Pr[X = x] = n−1 n(2 n −1) . We have H min (X) = log n, so using a (log n, 1/n)-strong extractor we could obtain at most log n bits of randomness. But X is already 1/n-close to uniform, since
So we already have n bits of nearly uniform randomness, exponentially more than by using a (log n, 1/n)-strong extractor.
In the case of quantum extractors, similar examples can be found, e.g., in [TCR10, Remark 22] . However, an upper bound on the extractable randomness can be obtained by replacing the min-entropy by the smooth minentropy (Definition 2.2). More precisely, the total number of ε-uniform bits that can be extracted in the presence of side information E can never exceed
Conversely, the next lemma implies that an extractor which is known to extract m bits from any source such that H min (X|E) ≥ k can in fact extract the same number of bits, albeit with a slightly larger error, from sources which only satisfy H ε ′ min (X|E) ≥ k, a much weaker requirement in some cases.
m is a quantum-proof (k, ε)-strong extractor, then for any state ρ XE and any ε ′ > 0 with H
Proof. Letρ XE be the state ε ′ -close to ρ XE for which H min (X|E)ρ reaches its maximum. Then
In the second inequality above we used (twice) the fact that a trace-preserving quantum operation can only decrease the trace distance. And in the last line we used the fact that the purified distance -used to measure the distance between two states (see Definition 2.2) -is larger than the trace distance.
Remark 3.6. Since a (k, ε)-strong extractor can be applied to any source with smooth min-entropy H ε ′ min (X|E) ≥ k, we can measure the entropy loss of the extractor -namely how much entropy was not extracted -with
where m is the size of the output. From Eq. (4) we have that an extractor has optimal entropy loss if ∆ = 2 log 1/ε + O(1).
Constructing m-bit extractors from one-bit extractors and weak designs
In this section we show how to construct a quantum m-bit extractor from any (classical) 1-bit strong extractor. This can be seen as a derandomization of a result by König and Terhal [KT08] , who also extract m bits in the presence of quantum side information by concatenating m times a 1-bit extractor. They however choose a different seed for each bit, thus having a seed of total length d = mt, where t is the length of the seed of the 1-bit extractor. In the case of classical side information, this derandomization was done by Trevisan [Tre01] , who shows how to concatenate m times a 1-bit extractor using only d = poly(t, log m) bits of seed.
6 We combine the weak designs from Raz et al.
[RRV02], which they use to improve Trevisan's extractor, and a previous observation by two of the authors [DV10] , that since 1-bit extractors were shown to be quantum-proof in [KT08], Trevisan's extractor is also quantum-proof.
This results in a generic scheme, which can be based on any weak design and 1-bit strong extractor. We define it in Section 4.1, then prove bounds on the min-entropy and error in Section 4.2.
Description of Trevisan's construction
The seeds for the different outputs of the 1-bit extractor must however be nearly independent. To achieve this, Nisan and Wigderson [NW94] proposed to minimize the overlap |S i ∩ S j | between the sets, and Trevisan used this idea in his original work [Tre01] . Raz et al.
[RRV02] improved this, showing that it is sufficient for these sets to meet the conditions of a weak design. 
For all i,
We can now describe Trevisan's generic extractor construction.
Definition 4.2 (Trevisan's extractor). For a one-bit extractor
t → {0, 1}, which uses a (not necessarily uniform) seed of length t, and for a weak (t, r)-design S 1 , . . . , S m ⊂ [d], we define the m-bit extractor Ext C :
Remark 4.3. The length of the seed of the extractor Ext C is d, one of the parameters of the weak design, which in turn depends on t, the size of the seed of the 1-bit extractor C. In Section 5 we will give concrete instantiations of weak designs and 1-bit extractors, achieving various entropy losses and seed sizes. The size of the seed will always be d = poly(log n), if the error is ε = poly(1/n). For example, to achieve a near optimal entropy loss (Section 5.1), we need d = O(t 2 log m) and t = O(log n), hence d = O(log 3 n).
Analysis
We now prove that the extractor defined in the previous section is a quantumproof strong extractor. The first step follows the structure of the classical proof [Tre01, RRV02] . We show that an adversary holding the side information and who can distinguish the output of the extractor Ext C from uniform can -given a little extra information -distinguish the output of the underlying 1-bit extractor C from uniform. This is summed up in the following proposition:
7 The second condition of the weak design was originally defined as
. We prefer to use the version of [HR03] , since it simplifies the notation without changing the design constructions.
Proposition 4.4. Let X be a classical random variable correlated to some quantum system E, let Y be a (not necessarily uniform) seed, independent from XE, and let
where Ext C is the extractor from Definition 4.2. Then there exists a partition of the seed Y in two substrings V and W , and a classical random variable G, such that G has size H 0 (G) ≤ rm, where r is one of the parameters of the weak design (Definition 4.1), V ↔ W ↔ G form a Markov chain, 8 and
We provide a proof of Proposition 4.4 in Appendix B.2, where it is restated as Proposition B.5.
9
For readers familiar with Trevisan's scheme [Tre01, RRV02], we briefly sketch the correspondence between the variables of Proposition 4.4 and quantities analyzed in Trevisan's construction. Trevisan's security proof proceeds by assuming by contradiction that there exists an adversary, holding E, who can distinguish between the output of the extractor and the uniform distribution (Eq. (5)). Part of the seed is then fixed (this corresponds to W in the above statement) and some classical advice is taken (this corresponds to G in the above statement) to construct another adversary who can distinguish a specific bit of the output from uniform. But since a specific bit of Trevisan's extractor is just the underlying 1-bit extractor applied to a substring of the seed (V in the above statement), this new adversary (who holds W GE) can distinguish the output of the 1-bit extractor from uniform (Eq. (6)).
In the classical case Proposition 4.4 would be sufficient to prove the correctness of Trevisan's scheme, since it shows that if an adversary can distinguish Ext C from uniform, then he can distinguish C from uniform given a few extra advice bits, which contradicts the assumption that C is an extractor.
10 But since our assumption is that the underlying 1-bit extractor is only classicalproof, we still need to show that the quantum adversary who can distinguish C(X, V ) from uniform is not more powerful than a classical adversary, and so if he can distinguish the output of C form uniform, so can a classical adversary. This has already been done by König and Terhal [KT08] , who show that 1-bit extractors are quantum-proof.
Theorem 4.5 ([KT08, Theorem III.1]). Let C : {0, 1}
n × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} be a (k, ε)-strong extractor. Then C is a quantum-proof (k + log 1/ε, 3 √ ε)-strong extractor.
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We now need to put Proposition 4.4 and Theorem 4.5 together to prove that Trevisan's extractor is quantum-proof. The cases of uniform and weak random seeds differ somewhat in the details. We therefore give two separate proofs for these two cases in Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2.
Uniform seed
We show that Trevisan's extractor is a quantum-proof strong extractor with uniform seed with the following parameters.
Theorem 4.6. Let C : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} be a (k, ε)-strong extractor with uniform seed and S 1 , . . . , S m ⊂ [d] a weak (t, r)-design. Then the extractor given in Definition 4.2,
Proof. In Proposition 4.4, if the seed Y is uniform, then V is independent from W and hence by the Markov chain property from G as well, so Eq. (6) can be rewritten as
which corresponds to the exact security criterion of the definition of an extractor. Let C be a (k, ε)-strong extractor with uniform seed, and assume that an adversary holds a system E such that
Then by Proposition 4.4 and because Y is uniform, we know that there exists a classical system G with H 0 (G) ≤ rm, and a partition of Y in V and W , such that,
Since C is a (k, ε)-strong extractor, we know from Theorem 4.5 that we must have H min (X|W GE) < k + log 1/ε for Eq. (7) to hold. Hence by Lemma B.3, H min (X|E) = H min (X|W E) ≤ H min (X|W GE)+ H 0 (G) < k + rm+ log 1/ε.
Weak random seed
We also show that Trevisan's extractor is a quantum-proof strong extractor with weak random seed, with the following parameters.
Theorem 4.7. Let C : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} be a (k, ε)-strong extractor with an s-bit seed -i.e., the seed needs at least s bits of min-entropy -and S 1 , . . . , S m ⊂ [d] a weak (t, r)-design. Then the extractor given in Definition 4.2,
m , is a quantum-proof (k+rm+log 1/ε, 6m √ ε)-strong extractor for any seed with min-entropy d − (t − s − log
The main difference between this proof and that of Theorem 4.6, is that since the seed Y is not uniform in Proposition 4.4, the substring W of the seed not used by the 1-bit extractor C is correlated to the seed V of C, and acts as classical side information about the seed. To handle this, we show in Lemma A.3 that with probability 1 − ε over the values of W , V still contains a lot of minentropy, roughly s ′ − d ′ , where d ′ is the length of W and s ′ the min-entropy of Y . And hence an adversary holding W GE can distinguish the output of C from uniform, even though the seed has enough min-entropy.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. Let C be a (k, ε)-strong extractor with s bits of minentropy in the seed, and assume that an adversary holds a system E such that
Then by Proposition 4.4 we have
Since the adversary has classical side-information W about the seed V , we need an extra step to handle it. Lemma A.3 tells us that from Eq. (8) and because by Theorem 4.5, C is a quantum (k + log 1/ε, 3 √ ε)-strong extractor, we must have either for some w, H min (X|GEW = w) < k + log 1/ε and hence
, from which we obtain using Lemma B.1,
Concrete constructions
Depending on what goal has been set -e.g., maximize the output, minimize the seed length -different 1-bit extractors and weak designs will be needed. In this section we give a few examples of what can be done, by taking various classical extractors and designs, and plugging them into Theorem 4.6 (or Theorem 4.7), to obtain bounds on the seed size and entropy loss in the presence of quantum side information. The results are usually given using the O-notation. This is always meant with respect to all the free variables, e.g., O(1) is a constant independent of the input length n, the output length m, and the error ε. Likewise, o(1) goes to 0 for both n and m large.
We first consider the problem of extracting all the min-entropy of the source in Section 5.1. This was achieved in the classical case by Raz et al. [RRV02], so we use the same 1-bit extractor and weak design as them.
In Section 5.2 we give a scheme which uses a seed of length d = O(log n), but can only extract part of the entropy. This is also based on Raz et al. [RRV02] in the classical case.
In Section 5.3 we combine an extractor and design which are locally computable (from Vadhan [Vad04] and Hartman and Raz [HR03] respectively), to produce a quantum m-bit extractor, such that each bit of the output depends on only O(log(m/ε)) bits of the input.
And finally in Section 5.4 we use a 1-bit extractor from Raz [Raz05] , which only requires a weakly random seed, resulting in a quantum m-bit extractor, which also works with a weakly random seed.
These constructions are summarized in Table 1 on page 5.
Near optimal entropy loss
To achieve a near optimal entropy loss we need to combine a 1-bit extractor with near optimal entropy loss and a weak (t, 1)-design. We use the same extractor and design as Raz et al.
[RRV02] to do so. 
is a quantum-proof (m + 8 log m + 8 log 1/ε + O(1), ε)-strong extractor with uniform seed, with d = O(log 2 (n/ε) log m).
For ε = poly(1/n) the seed has length d = O(log 3 n). The entropy loss is ∆ = 8 log m + 8 log 1/ε + O(1), which means that the input still has this much randomness left in it (conditioned on the output). We can extract a bit more by now applying a second extractor to the input. For this we will use the extractor by Tomamichel et al [TSSR10] , which is a quantum (k ′ , ε ′ )-strong extractor with seed length d ′ = O(m ′ +log n ′ +log 1/ε ′ ) and entropy loss ∆ ′ = 4 log 1/ε ′ +O(1), where n ′ and m ′ are the input and output string lengths. Since we will use it for m ′ = 8 log m + 4 log 1/ε ′ + O(1), we immediately get the following corollary from Lemma A.4. For ε = poly(1/n) the seed has length d = O(log 3 n). The entropy loss is ∆ = 4 log 1/ε + O(1), which is only a factor 2 times larger than the optimal entropy loss. By Lemma 3.5 this extractor can produce m = H ε min (X|E) − 4 log 1/ε − O(1) bits of randomness with an error 3ε.
Seed of logarithmic size
The weak design used in Section 5.1 requires a seed of length d = Θ(t 2 log m), where t is the size of the seed of the 1-bit extractor. Since t cannot be less than log n, a scheme using this design will always have d = Ω(log 2 n log m). If we want to use a seed of size d = O(log n) we need a different weak design. For the 1-bit extractor we can use the same as in the previous section, Proposition 5.2.
Plugging this into Theorem 4.6 with log r = Θ(t), we get a quantum extractor with logarithmic seed length.
Corollary 5.6. If for any constant 0 < α ≤ 1, the source has min-entropy H min (X|E) = n α , and the desired error is ε = poly(1/n), then using the extractor C n,δ : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} from Proposition 5.2 with δ = ε 2 9m 2 and the weak (t, r)-design S 1 , . . . , S m ⊂ [d] from Lemma 5.5 with r = n γ for any 0 < γ < α, we have that
is a quantum-proof 
Locally computable extractor
Another interesting feature of extractors is to be local, that is, the m-bit output depends only a small subset of the n input bits. This is useful in, e.g., the bounded storage model (see [Mau92, Lu04, Vad04] for the case of a classical adversary and [KR07] for a general quantum treatment), where we assume a huge source of random bits, say n, are available, and the adversary's storage is bounded by νn for some constant ν < 1. Legitimate parties are also assumed to have bounded workspace for computation. In particular, for the model to be meaningful, the bound is stricter than that on the adversary. So to extract a secret key from the large source of randomness, they need an extractor which only reads ℓ ≪ n bits.
Definition 5.7 (ℓ-local extractor). An extractor Ext :
m is ℓ-locally computable (or ℓ-local ), if for every r ∈ {0, 1} d , the function x → Ext(x, r) depends on only ℓ bits of its input, where the bit locations are determined by r.
Lu [Lu04] modified Trevisan's scheme [Tre01, RRV02] to use a local listdecodable code as 1-bit extractor. Vadhan [Vad04] proposes another construction for local extractors, which is optimal up to constant factors. Both these constructions have similar parameters in the case of 1-bit extractors. 13 We state the parameters of Vadhan's construction here and Lu's constructions in Appendix C.
Lemma 5.8 ([Vad04, Theorem 8.5]). For any ε > exp −n/2 O(log * n) , n ∈ N and constant 0 < γ < 1, there exists an explicit ℓ-local (k, ε)-strong extractor with uniform seed Ext n,ε,γ : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} with d = O(log(n/ε)), k = γn and ℓ = O(log 1/ε).
Since we assume that the available memory is limited, we also want the construction of the weak design to be particularly efficient. For this we can use a construction by Hartman and Raz [HR03] .
Lemma 5.9 ([HR03, Theorem 3]). For every m, t ∈ N, such that m = Ω(t log t ) and constant r > 1, there exists an explicit weak (t, r)-design S 1 , . . . ,
. Such a design can be found in time poly(log m, t) and space poly(log m + log t).
Remark 5.10. For the extractor from Lemma 5.8 and an error ε = poly(1/n), this design requires m = Ω (log n) log log n . If we are interested in a smaller m, say m = poly(log n), then we can use the weak design from Lemma 5.5 with r = n γ . This construction would require time and space poly(log n) = poly(log 1/ε). The resulting seed would have length only O(log n) instead of O(log 2 n).
Plugging this into Theorem 4.6 we get a quantum local extractor.
Corollary 5.11. If for any constant 0 < α ≤ 1, the source has min-entropy H min (X|E) = αn, then using the weak (t, r)-design S 1 , . . . , S m ⊂ [d] from Lemma 5.9 and the extractor C n,δ,γ : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} from Lemma 5.8 with δ = ε 2 9m 2 and any constant γ < α, we have that
is a quantum-proof ℓ-local (γn + rm + 2 log m + 2 log 1/ε + O(1), ε)-strong extractor with uniform seed, with d = O(log 2 (n/ε)) and ℓ = O(m log(m/ε)). Furthermore, each bit of the output depends on only O(log(m/ε)) bits of the input.
With these parameters the extractor can produce up to m = (α − γ)n/r − O(log 1/ε) = (H min (X|E) − γn)/r − O(log 1/ε) bits of randomness, with ε = poly(1/n). By Lemma 3.5 this can be increased to m = (H ε min (X|E) − γn)/r − O(log 1/ε) with an error of 3ε.
Weak random seed
Extractors with weak random seeds typically require the seed to have a minentropy linear in its length. Theorem 4.7 says that the difference between the length and the min-entropy of the seed needed in Trevisan's extractor is roughly the same as the difference between the length and min-entropy of the seed of the underlying 1-bit extractor. So we will describe in detail how to modify the construction from Section 5.2 to use a weakly random seed. As that extractor uses a seed of length O(log n), this new construction allows us to preserve the linear loss in the min-entropy of the seed. Any other version of Trevisan's extractor can be modified in the same way to use a weakly random seed, albeit with weaker parameters.
We will use a result by Raz [Raz05] , which allows any extractor which needs a uniform seed to be transformed into one which can work with a weakly random seed. By applying this lemma to the 1-bit extractor given in Proposition 5.2, we obtain the following 1-bit extractor.
Corollary 5.13. For any ε > 0 and n ∈ N there exists a (k, ε)-strong extractor Ext n,ε : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} requiring a seed with min-entropy
1 β log(n/ε)) and k = 3 log 1/ε + 3. Plugging this and the weak design from Lemma 5.5 in Theorem 4.7, we get the following extractor with weak random seed.
Corollary 5.14. Let α > 0 be a constant such that the source has min-entropy H min (X|E) = n α , and the desired error is ε = poly(1/n). Using the extractor C n,δ : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} from Corollary 5.13 with δ = 
Other variations of Trevisan's scheme
There exist many results modifying and improving Trevisan's extractor. Some of them still follow the "design and 1-bit extractor" pattern -hence our work implies that these are immediately quantum-proof with roughly the same parameters -e.g., the work of Raz et al.
[RRV02] and Lu [Lu04] , which were mentioned in Section 5 and correspond to modifications of the design and 1-bit extractor respectively. Other results such as [RRV02, TSZS06, SU05] replace the binary list-decoding codes with multivariate codes over a field F . The connection to 1-bit extractors is not clear anymore, and the security in the presence of quantum side information not guaranteed. Raz et al. extract a little more randomness than we do in Section 5.1. They achieve this by composing (in the sense described in Appendix A.2) the scheme of Corollary 5.3 with an extractor by Srinivasan and Zuckerman [SZ99] , which has an optimal entropy loss of ∆ = 2 log 1/ε + O(1). In the presence of quantum side information this extractor has only been proven to have an entropy loss of ∆ = 4 log 1/ε + O(1) in [TSSR10] , hence our slightly weaker result in Corollary 5.4. This still leaves room for a small improvement.
In the case of a logarithmic seed length, Impagliazzo et al. [ISW00] and Ta In Section 3.1 we defined extractors as functions which take a uniformly random seed. This is the most common way of defining them, but not a necessary condition. Instead we can consider extractors which use a seed which is only weakly random, but with a bounded min-entropy. We extend Definition 3.1 this way.
Definition A.1 (strong extractor with weak random seed). A function Ext :
m is a (k, ε)-strong extractor with an s-bit seed, if for all distributions X with H min (X) ≥ k and any seed Y independent from X with
If quantum side information about the input is present in a system E, then as before, we require the seed and the output to be independent from that side-information. Definition A.2 (quantum-proof strong extractor with weak random seed). A function Ext : {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} d → {0, 1} m is a quantum-proof (k, ε)-strong extractor with an s-bit seed, if for all states ρ XE classical on X with H min (X|E) ρ ≥ k, and for any seed Y independent from XE with H min (Y ) ≥ s, we have
Lemma 3.3 says that any extractor will work with roughly the same parameters when classical side information about the input X is present. The same holds in the case of classical side information Z about the seed Y .
m be a quantum-proof (k, ε)-strong extractor with an s-bit seed. Then for any classical X, Y and Z, and quantum E, such that XE and Y are independent, Y ↔ Z ↔ E form a Markov chain, 15 H min (Y |Z) ≥ s + log 1/ε, and for all z ∈ Z,
Proof. For any two classical systems Y and Z, we have
so by Markov's inequality,
And since Y ↔ Z ↔ E form a Markov chain, we have for all z ∈ Z,
The case of quantum side information correlated to both the input and the seed is out of the scope of this work.
A.2 Composing extractors
If an extractor does not have optimal entropy loss, a useful approach to extract more entropy is to apply a second extractor to the original input, trying to extract the randomness that remains when the output of the first extractor is known. This was first proposed in the classical case by Wigderson and Zuckerman [WZ99] , and improved by Raz et al. [RRV02] . König and Terhal [KT08] gave the first quantum version for composing m times quantum 1-bit extractors. We slightly generalize the result of König and Terhal [KT08] to the composition of arbitrary quantum extractors.
15 A ccq state ρ XY E forms a Markov chain X ↔ Y ↔ E if it can be expressed as ρ XY E = x,y P XY (x, y)|x, y x, y| ⊗ ρ
d2 → {0, 1} m2 be quantum-proof (k, ε 1 )-and (k −m 1 , ε 2 )-strong extractors. Then the composition of the two, namely
is a quantum-proof (k, ε 1 + ε 2 )-strong extractor.
Proof. We need to show that for any state ρ XE with H min (X|E) ≥ k,
The left-hand side of Eq. (9) can be upper-bounded by
By the definition of Ext 1 the first term in Eq. (10) is upper-bounded by ε 1 . For the second term we use Lemma B.3 and get
By the definition of Ext 2 the second term in Eq. (10) can then be upper-bounded by ε 2 .
B Technical lemmas B.1 Min-entropy chain rules
We use the following "chain-rule type" statement about the min-entropy. The proofs for the two first can be found in [Ren05] .
Lemma B.1 ([Ren05, Lemma 3.1.10]). For any state ρ ABC ,
where H 0 (C) = log rank(ρ C ).
Lemma B.2 ([Ren05, Lemma 3.1.9]). For any state ρ ABZ classical on Z,
Lemma B.3. For any state ρ ABZ classical on Z,
where H 0 (Z) = log rank(ρ Z ).
Proof. Immediate by combining Lemma B.1 and Lemma B.2.
B.2 Security reduction
To show that an adversary who can distinguish the output of Ext C (defined in Definition 4.2 on page 10) from uniform can also guess the output of the extractor C, we first show that such an adversary can guess one of the bits of the output of Ext C given some extra classical information. This is a quantum version of a result by Yao [Yao82] .
v, we can only increase the trace distance, hence By rearranging this a little more we finally get
where G is a classical system of size H 0 (G) ≤ C List-decodable codes are one-bit extractors
C.1 Construction
A standard error correcting code guarantees that if the error is small, any string can be uniquely decoded. A list-decodable code guarantees that for a larger (but bounded) error, any string can be decoded to a list of possible messages. is a (log L + log 1/2ε, 2ε)-strong extractor. We have rewritten their proof in Section C.2 for completeness.
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There exist list-decodable codes with following parameters.
Lemma C.2. For every n ∈ N and δ > 0 there is a code C n,δ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}n, which is (δ, 1/δ 2 )-list-decodable, withn = poly(n, 1/δ). Furthermore, C n,δ can be evaluated in time poly(n, 1/δ) andn can be assumed to be a power of 2.
For example, Guruswami et al.
[GHSZ02] combine a Reed-Solomon code with a Hadamard code, obtaining such a list-decodable code withn = O(n/δ 4 ). Such codes require all bits of the input x to be read to compute any single bit C(x) i of the output. If we are interested in so-called local codes, we can use a construction by Lu [Lu04] .
Lemma C.3 ([Lu04, Corollary 1]). For every n ∈ N, 0 < δ < 1/m and constant 0 < γ < 1, there is a code C n,δ,γ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}n, which is δ, 2 γn /δ 2 -listdecodable, withn = poly(n, 1/δ). Furthermore, for every i ∈ [n], C n,δ,γ (x) i is the parity of O(log(1/mδ)) bits of x.
C.2 Proof
Theorem C.4. Let C : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}n be an (ε, L)-list-decodable code. Then the function
is a (log L + log 1/2ε, 2ε)-strong extractor.
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To prove this theorem we first show that an adversary who can distinguish the bits of C(X) from uniform can construct a string α which is close to C(X) on average (over X). Then using the error correcting proprieties of the code C, he can reconstruct X. Hence an adversary who can break the extractor must have low min-entropy about X.
Lemma C.5. Let X and Y be two independent random variables with alphabets {0, 1} n and [n] respectively. Let Y be uniformly distributed and X be distributed such that Proof. Define α ∈ {0, 1} n to be the concatenation of the most probable bits of X, i.e., α y := arg max b P Xy (b), where P Xy (b) = x∈{0,1} 
We now wish to lower bound the probability that the average Hamming distance is less than 
Combining Eqs. (15) and (16) we get w(B) > δ 1 − δ ≥ δ.
We are now ready to prove Theorem C.4.
Proof of Theorem C.4. We will show that if it is possible to distinguish C ′ (X, Y ) from uniform with probability at least 2ε, then X must have min-entropy H min (X) < log L + log 1/2ε. If
